Neoliberal reform and protest in Latin American democracies: A replication and correction by Solt, Frederick et al.
Research and Politics
July-Septemper 2014: 1 –13
© The Author(s) 2014
DOI: 10.1177/2053168014545413
rap.sagepub.com
Creative Commons CC-BY: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License (http://
www.creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/) which permits any use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further 
permission provided the original work is attributed as specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (http://www.uk.sagepub.com/aboutus/
openaccess.htm).
The latter decades of the twentieth century witnessed two 
dramatic transformations across Latin America: a univer-
sal, if uneven, adoption of economically liberalizing 
reforms and a near complete replacement of the region’s 
autocracies with more democratic regimes. Not surpris-
ingly, the relationship between these two processes has 
been intensely debated (see, e.g., Huber and Solt, 2004; 
Walton 2004). Many have argued that economic liberaliza-
tion, by shifting decision-making power on a wide variety 
of matters from state to market, has limited and undercut 
democratic governance and so worked to demobilize civil 
society (see, e.g., Kurtz, 2004). Others have contended that 
the hardships imposed by liberalization have in fact rein-
vigorated democracy by spurring a variety of societal actors 
to organize themselves and mobilize against neoliberal 
reforms (see, e.g., Silva, 2009). Determining which of these 
perspectives more accurately depicts the relationship 
between economic liberalization and collective political 
action in Latin American democracies is central to under-
standing if market liberalism has successfully redefined 
citizenship rights as exclusively political or if instead col-
lective actors are broadening the concept of democratic 
citizenship to include social and economic rights. It speaks, 
in other words, to the question of which side of Polanyi’s 
(1944) ‘double movement’ has gained the upper hand 
across the region (see, e.g., Roberts, 2008).
Bellinger and Arce (2011), in their article entitled 
‘Protest and democracy in Latin America’s market era’, 
provide the broadest empirical examination yet conducted 
on this question, examining the impacts of economic liber-
alization on protest in seventeen Latin American countries 
from 1970 to 2003. It argues for the second view outlined 
above, the repoliticization thesis, maintaining that griev-
ances resulting from economic liberalization provide strong 
framing opportunities for diverse social actors to overcome 
their collective action problems and that, in the favorable 
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political opportunity provided by democracy, the result will 
be more protest. After presenting a series of unconditional 
fixed effects negative binomial regression models, the arti-
cle concludes that ‘collective political activity rises with 
economic liberalization in democratic and semidemocratic 
contexts’ (Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 699). Consequently, it 
maintains that fears that market-oriented reforms have 
eroded democracy across the region are unwarranted. On 
the contrary, it contends, there is reason for optimism: eco-
nomically liberalizing reforms ‘are extending and deepen-
ing democracy’ (Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 700).
The article makes several important contributions to the 
ongoing debate. Scholarship on the question had been pre-
viously dominated by case studies of positive examples of 
mobilization, with the result that ‘although it is indisputa-
ble that much of the social protest in contemporary Latin 
America is explicitly directed against neoliberal policies’, 
the relationship between reform and protest had ‘not been 
subjected to rigorous empirical tests across cases and over 
time’ (Roberts, 2008: 338). Further, Bellinger and Arce 
(2011) examines trends in protest in the region over more 
than three decades, ensuring the inclusion of both the full 
process of economic liberalization and that of democratiza-
tion. The article is also an exemplar of sensitivity analysis, 
operationalizing both regime type and protest in a number 
of different ways and demonstrating similar results across 
all specifications. Finally, it usefully sharpens the concept 
of economic liberalization to better match the theories sug-
gested by qualitative studies on the topic. In contrast to ear-
lier cross-national work, which investigated whether protest 
was associated with the level of liberal economic policies, 
Bellinger and Arce (2011, 692) examines how collective 
actors ‘respond to changes in economic policy’ because 
arguments regarding the phenomenon focus ‘on the societal 
effects of economic reforms, not the level of economic lib-
eralization generally’.
Despite these important contributions, our re-analysis 
reveals that the claims by Bellinger and Arce (2011) are 
based on an incorrect interpretation of its statistical results. 
Specifically, the study runs into two pitfalls often encoun-
tered in the use of multiplicative interaction terms: it incor-
rectly interprets the coefficients separately and fails to 
calculate correctly the marginal effect of the variable of 
theoretical interest (see, e.g., Braumoeller, 2004; Brambor 
et al., 2006). Remedying these issues demonstrates that 
there is no support for the contention that economic liber-
alization produces higher rates of collective political pro-
tests in democratic or semidemocratic settings, dampening 
hopes that unfettered markets and democracy are proving a 
felicitous combination in Latin America.
Replication, results and 
reinterpretation
According to the repoliticization theory, protest in Latin 
America results from a confluence of motive and opportunity 
(Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 691–692). Economic liberaliza-
tion, in this view, always generates grievances that motivate 
people to collective action. These grievances are more likely 
to actually cause protests to occur, however, when democracy 
is present to provide a favorable political opportunity struc-
ture. The implication is that, at least in democracies, protests 
should increase as liberalizing reforms increase. The article 
claims that the evidence it presents supports this argument. 
This claim is incorrect.
The faulty claim stems from the interpretation of multi-
plicative interaction terms. The analyses presented use 
negative binomial regression – a method that logarithmi-
cally transforms the dependent variable to account for the 
skewed distributions commonly found in count data – to 
estimate the following equation:
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In this equation, β3 and β5, the coefficients for the two 
multiplicative interaction terms, allow the effect of eco-
nomic liberalization on protest to vary with regime type: 
democracy, semidemocracy, or autocracy.1 These multipli-
cative interaction terms are completely appropriate. That 
protests should become more common as economic reforms 
intensify and especially so in democratic (and, perhaps, 
semidemocratic) settings is, of course, a conditional hypoth-
esis, and it is ‘well established that the intuition behind con-
ditional hypotheses is captured quite well by multiplicative 
interaction models’ (Brambor et al., 2006: 64).
It is equally well established that models containing 
multiplicative interaction terms require particular care in 
interpretation (see, e.g., Braumoeller, 2004; Brambor et al., 
2006). Here, the article’s conclusions were justified on two 
foundations: first, that ‘the interaction terms – Economic 
Liberalization × Democracy and Economic Liberalization 
× Semidemocracy —are positive and significant’ and, sec-
ond, that the conditional ‘coefficients for Democracy and 
Semidemocracy grow larger, more positive, and statisti-
cally significant when economic liberalization increases’ 
(Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 695). We reproduce the relevant 
Bellinger and Arce (2011) results in Table 1.
Neither of these two foundations is up to the task. The 
former is insufficient to support the conclusion: as Brambor 
et al., (2006: 74) note, the ‘analyst cannot even infer whether 
X has a meaningful conditional effect on Y from the magni-
tude and significance of the coefficient on the interaction 
term’. We show below that the coefficient of the interaction 
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term is only one component of the effect being examined 
here. The latter is not directly relevant to the question at 
hand. Given that the study is ‘primarily concerned with how 
collective actors respond to economic liberalization in vary-
ing political contexts’ (Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 695), it is 
the coefficient of Economic Liberalization for each regime 
type that is much more to the point.
A reinterpretation of these results is therefore needed.2 
The marginal effect of economic liberalization on the 
logged number of protests (recall that negative binomial 
regressions directly estimate the effects of independent 
variables on the log of the dependent variable) is found by 
taking the partial derivative of Equation 1 with respect to 
economic liberalization:
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That is, the estimated effect on logged protest of a 
change in economic liberalization equals the sum of (1) the 
estimated coefficient of economic liberalization, β1, (2) the 
product of the coefficient of the interaction between liber-
alization and democracy, β3, and the indicator variable for 
democracy, and (3) the product of the coefficient of the 
interaction between liberalization and semidemocracy, β5, 
and the indicator variable for semidemocracy. This simpli-
fies to the sum β1 +β 3 for democratic regimes, to the sum β1 
+β5 for semidemocracies, and to just β1 for autocratic 
regimes. This last point makes clear the only appropriate 
interpretation of β3 and β5: they represent not the effects of 
Economic Liberalization in democracies and semidemocra-
cies, as asserted in Bellinger and Arce (2011, 695), but 
rather only the difference in the effect of Economic 
Liberalization from its effect in the reference category, 
autocratic regimes.
Calculating the magnitude of the effect in each of the 
three regime types is straightforward, but the standard error 
(and statistical significance) of only the reference category, 
autocratic regimes, can be determined from the information 
provided in the article’s tables. The formula for the stand-
ard error for democratic regimes is:
 SE var var covβ β β β β β1 3 1 3 1 32+ = + +( ) ( ) ( , )  (3)
Similarly, the standard error for semidemocratic regimes 
is calculated as:
 SE var var covβ β β β β β1 5 1 5 1 52+ = + +( ) ( ) ( , )  (4)
Although the variances of β1, β3, and β5 are easily found 
in the article’s tables – they are the squares of the standard 
errors for these coefficients – the covariances between the 
coefficients are not available from the information provided 
in a regression table: instead, the full variance-covariance 
matrix is needed.
As a practical matter, the most straightforward approach 
to finding these standard errors is a trivial re-specification 
of the model: the choice of reference category for a categor-
ical variable is arbitrary, and the standard error of the coef-
ficient for the reference category chosen is directly available 
in the regression results (see, e.g., Braumoeller, 2004: 815; 
Brambor et al., 2006: 74). Here, replacing the dummy vari-
able for democracies in Equation 1 with a dummy variable 
for autocratic regimes – that is, making democracy the ref-
erence category – makes no substantive change in the 
model, but the reported coefficient and standard error of 
Economic Liberalization in this re-specified model (corre-
sponding to β1 in the equations above) represent its effect in 
democracies. The standard error and statistical significance 
of the effect of Economic Liberalization in semidemocra-
cies can be found similarly, by including dummy variables 
for autocracies and democracies and so making semidem-
ocracy the reference category.
Using a dot-and-whisker plot (see Kastellec and Leoni, 
2007), Figure 1 depicts graphically the estimates and 95% 
confidence intervals of the effect of economic liberalization 
on the logged number of protests for each regime type when 
countries are classified according to Freedom House data.3 
Table 1. Economic Reform and Protest: Bellinger and Arce (2011) Results.
Model 1 Model 9 Model 12 Model 15
 Total Protests Strikes Riots Demonstrations
 Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Liberalizing Reform −10.13* (3.94) −10.48* (2.51) −15.66* (2.82) −6.31 (3.71)
Democracy 0.12 (0.35) 0.08 (0.46) 0.40 (0.40) −0.48 (0.39)
Liberalizing Reform × Democracy 12.53* (4.40) 11.58* (4.05) 14.27* (4.15) 9.79* (4.65)
Semidemocracy 0.36 (0.33) −0.02 (0.46) 0.51 (0.38) 0.13 (0.39)
Liberalizing Reform × Semidemocracy 7.40* (3.63) 5.85 (3.92) 16.22* (4.13) 5.41 (3.78)
*p < .05; results for control variables omitted
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We follow Bellinger and Arce (2011: 693) in emphasizing 
the Freedom House results because ‘Freedom House argu-
ably provides the closest match to [the] conceptualization of 
political opportunity’ employed in that piece. As Bellinger 
and Arce (2011) demonstrate, and our replication confirmed, 
a variety of other measures of regime type yield substan-
tively similar results; we therefore relegate these results to 
the appendix. Figure 1 displays how the results of the nega-
tive binomial regressions indicate that economic liberaliza-
tion does not have a statistically significant effect on protest: 
this is true whether we look at the total number of protests 
(Model 1 of Bellinger and Arce (2011)), or strikes (Model 
9), or riots (Model 12), or anti-government demonstra-
tions (Model 15). The results show that in autocracies the 
liberalizing reform variable was statistically significantly 
associated with fewer protests, with the exception of dem-
onstrations. In light of this finding, the fact that β3 and β5 are 
estimated to be positive and statistically significant reveals 
only that more liberalizing reform in democracies and semi-
democracies did not have the negative association with pro-
test that it did in autocracies, not that it served as a focal 
point for the formation and mobilization of collective actors 
as the repoliticization theory would have it.
We, of course, are more directly interested in the effect 
of economic reforms on the number of protests, not on the 
log of protests and, as noted above, the latter is the quantity 
estimated by the negative binomial regression employed in 
Bellinger and Arce (2011). Figure 2 presents the number of 
protests in autocracies, semidemocracies, and democracies 
predicted by the four models across the observed range of 
economic liberalization when all other variables are fixed 
at their mean values. In each case, the solid lines indicate 
the predicted number of protests and the shaded regions 
correspond to the 95% confidence intervals of these predic-
tions. For autocracies, the numbers of total protests, strikes 
and riots (but not demonstrations) are predicted to be statis-
tically significantly lower as liberalizing reform increases. 
For semidemocracies and democracies, the wide 
confidence intervals in every panel can easily encompass a 
horizontal line representing no change at all in protest 
activity over the range of economic liberalization. In fact, 
under these conditions, in semidemocracies the point pre-
dictions of all four measures of protest decline with rising 
liberalization, and in democracies riots are also predicted to 
fall as economic liberalization rises. None of this supports 
the interpretation that ‘collective political activity rises 
with economic liberalization in democratic and semidemo-
cratic contexts’ offered in Bellinger and Arce (2011: 699).
An extension: Protest and liberal 
economic reform
The results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) do not support the 
interpretation offered in that article. Liberalizing economic 
reforms in democracies do not in fact predict that more pro-
tests occur. The conclusion that they do, as we have shown 
above, was based on common misinterpretations of multi-
plicative interaction terms. The confusion regarding the 
application of multiplicative interaction terms is com-
pounded by the article’s measure of liberalizing reform.
A second look at Figure 2 reveals that liberalizing reform 
only has statistically significant effects on protest in auto-
cratic settings and that these effects occur largely, if not 
entirely, across only the negative values of the variable. As 
discussed above, however, the Bellinger and Arce (2011) 
measure of liberalizing reform represents change in the 
level of economic liberalization. Positive values represent 
reforms that increase the role of free markets and reduce the 
role of the state in the economy. Negative values, in turn, 
represent moves away from free markets; that is, statist 
reforms. Including both liberal reforms and statist reforms 
in the same measure in this way constrains them to have 
equal and opposite effects on protest. Given that changes in 
either direction may generate losers with incentives to 
mobilize, to assume that reforms in one direction increase 
protests and reforms in the other reduce them would seem 
unwise. Further, nothing in the repoliticization theory sug-
gests that the effect of liberal reforms is the opposite of 
statist reforms.
Removing this constraint is easily accomplished by 
splitting the measure into two variables. The first measures 
the magnitude of liberal reforms and takes on a value of 
zero when statist reforms are adopted; the second measures 
the magnitude of statist reforms and takes on a value of 
zero when liberal reforms are adopted. Table 2 presents the 
relevant results when these two variables are substituted for 
the original liberalizing reforms measure in the Bellinger 
and Arce (2011) models.
The coefficients for the interaction term between liberal 
reform and democracy indicate that there is no statistically 
significant difference between autocracies and democracies 
in the coefficient of liberal reform for total protests, strikes, 
or antigovernment demonstrations. There is a statistically 
Figure 1. Coefficients of economic reform on protest by 
regime type.
Notes: The points indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial 
regressions, and whiskers trace 95% confidence intervals. Replicated 
results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1 (Total Protests), Model 9 
(Strikes), Model 12 (Riots), and Model 15 (Demonstrations). Coeffi-
cients for control variables are not depicted.
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significant difference in the coefficient for riots, but as we 
noted earlier, because the effect in democracies of liberal 
reform on the logged number of riots is equal to the sum of 
this coefficient and the coefficient for liberal reform, this is 
insufficient to support the conclusion that riots increase 
with liberal reform in democracies. Figure 3 displays the 
coefficients and standard errors of liberal and statist eco-
nomic reforms in all three regime types.
It reveals that the estimated coefficient for liberal reforms 
in democracies on riots is in fact negative and not distin-
guishable from zero. The only statistically significant coef-
ficient for liberal reforms in democracies is on 
demonstrations. Any support this finding might provide for 
the repoliticization theory is more apparent than real, how-
ever. This coefficient is not statistically significantly differ-
ent from those for semidemocracies and autocracies, 
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Figure 2. Predicted protests over the observed range of economic reform by regime type.
Notes: Solid lines indicate predicted values and shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. Regimes are classified using Freedom House data; 
see text for details. Replicated results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1 (Total Protests), Model 9 (Strikes), Model 12 (Riots), and Model 15 
(Demonstrations). All other variables are fixed at mean values.
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providing no evidence that the more favorable political 
opportunity structure in democracies yields a more vigorous 
protest response. Moreover, the predicted difference in the 
actual quantity of interest, the number of demonstrations, 
between a country with no liberal reform and one with the 
largest observed liberal reform is small and not statistically 
significant: 0.9 ± 1.0 demonstrations, as can be seen in 
Figure 4. Like those for the other measures of protest, the 
confidence interval for the predicted number of demonstra-
tions in democracies can accommodate a horizontal line 
representing no change at all over the full observed range of 
liberal reform.
If, as we have demonstrated, the results of Bellinger and 
Arce (2011) and our extension to it do not support the repo-
liticization theory, what do they show? A re-examination of 
Figure 2 reveals that liberalizing reform, measured as a sin-
gle variable, only has statistically significant effects on pro-
test in autocratic settings and that these effects occur 
largely, if not entirely, across only the negative values of 
the variable. This point is confirmed in Figure 3: when lib-
eral and statist reforms are measured separately, the posi-
tive and statistically significant coefficients for statist 
reforms in autocracies stand out as the only consistent 
results. Figure 5 confirms these effects on the actual quanti-
ties of interest, the number of protests, over the observed 
range of statist reform.
Rather than speaking to how people have mobilized to 
protest against liberal reforms in Latin America’s democra-
cies, then, these results illuminate when people protested 
against the region’s dictatorships. Latin American autocra-
cies frequently pursued a two-pronged strategy of depoliti-
cization, pairing free market reforms of the economy with 
harsh repression of civil society. It was when these regimes 
backed away from free market policies – a signal that divi-
sions had arisen in the authoritarian coalition of the mili-
tary, domestic business, and foreign capital – that 
emboldened citizens went to the streets to protest.
Chile under Pinochet is the paradigmatic example on 
both counts. When its program of nearly complete financial 
deregulation led to financial crisis in 1982, the military 
government abruptly reversed course and intervened exten-
sively in the Chilean economy. Dubbed by critics the 
‘Chicago Road to Socialism’ in mocking reference to the 
Via Chilena that the Pinochet government had worked to 
eradicate, the statist reforms in Chile in 1983 are second in 
size in the Bellinger and Arce (2011) data only to those that 
marked the return of Peronism to Argentina in 1973. 
Massive demonstrations followed this sign of the 
Figure 3. Coefficients of statist and liberal economic reform 
on protest by regime type.
Notes: The points indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial 
regressions, and whiskers trace 95% confidence intervals. Results of 
Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1 (Total Protests), Model 9 (Strikes), 
Model 12 (Riots), and Model 15 (Demonstrations), but substituting 
separate variables for statist and liberal reforms in place of the single 
measure of economic reform employed in that study. Coefficients for 
control variables are not depicted.
Table 2. Disaggregated Economic Reform and Protest.
Total Protests Strikes Riots Demonstrations
 Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE) Estimate (SE)
Liberal Reform −5.52 (9.16) −8.12 (5.83) −22.17* (8.27) −3.40 (9.20)
Statist Reform 13.50* (2.62) 11.15 (3.70) 13.92 (4.56) 8.37 (2.25)
Democracy 0.16 (0.41) −0.01 (0.53) 0.29 (0.47) −0.51 (0.43)
Liberal Reform × Democracy 9.67 (9.41) 11.66 (6.41) 20.49* (9.72) 9.38 (9.51)
Statist Reform × Democracy −6.45 (7.44) 1.48 (7.22) −13.78 (10.09) 2.15 (8.40)
Semidemocracy 0.53 (0.35) 0.18 (0.49) 0.47 (0.45) 0.23 (0.40)
Liberal Reform × Semidemocracy 0.97 (8.31) −5.10 (8.39) 20.19 (11.03) 1.85 (8.13)
Statist Reform × Semidemocracy −17.86* (4.98) −19.95* (6.85) −20.30* (5.23) −10.22* (3.90)
*p < 0.05. Results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1 (Total Protests), Model 9 (Strikes), Model 12 (Riots), and Model 15 (Demonstrations), but 
substituting separate variables for statist and liberal reforms in place of the single measure of economic reform employed in that study. Coefficients 
for control variables not listed.
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government’s weakness: the observations for Chile from 
1983 through 1985 constitute three of the four highest pro-
test years in this dataset. For more on the Chilean case, see, 
among other works, Remmer (1989).
Conclusion
Despite the important contributions made by Bellinger 
and Arce (2011) to the debate on the relationships of eco-
nomic liberalization, democracy and protest, there is no 
support for the article’s conclusions in its empirical 
results. The repoliticization theory suggests that liberal-
izing reforms should, in democratic settings, provoke pro-
tests. In a critical re-analysis of the empirical evidence 
offered, we reveal that they do not. There is no support for 
the conclusion that liberalizing reforms produce political 
protests in Latin America’s democratic or semidemocratic 
regimes. Instead, this evidence indicates only that protests 
were only triggered by statist reforms in Latin American 
autocracies.
That economic liberalization may not consistently pro-
voke protest in democracies should not come as a surprise. 
Roberts’ (2008: 337) survey of the case-oriented scholar-
ship on resistance and acquiescence to neoliberal reforms 
in Latin America concludes, ‘Liberalization does not create 
homogeneous interests, hardships, or insecurities among 
subaltern groups, and neither does it generate a uniform 
response’. Future work on the issue should focus on eluci-
dating the conditions in which liberalizing reform by demo-
cratic governments generates collective protest.
One particularly important facet of this research will be 
the collection of higher quality data on protest across the 
region. The analyses replicated above, like previous cross-
national research, rely on data drawn from Banks (2008) 
for protest counts (see Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 692). As 
Herkenrath and Knoll (2011: 164) document, for Latin 
American countries these data are based solely on protest 
coverage in the New York Times. One might argue with 
some justification that events covered by the NYT ‘are pre-
cisely the type of events that affect national political 
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Figure 4. Predicted protests over the observed range of liberal economic reform by regime type.
Notes: Solid lines indicate predicted values, and shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. Regimes are classified using Freedom House data; 
see text for details. Results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1 (Total Protests), Model 9 (Strikes), Model 12 (Riots), and Model 15 (Demonstra-
tions), but substituting separate variables for statist and liberal reforms in place of the single measure of economic reform employed in that study. 
All other variables are fixed at mean values.
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Figure 5. Predicted protests over the observed range of statist economic reform in autocracies.
Notes: Solid lines indicate predicted values, and shaded regions indicate 95% confidence intervals. Autocracies are classified using Freedom House 
data; see text for details. Results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1 (Total Protests), Model 9 (Strikes), Model 12 (Riots), and Model 15 (Dem-
onstrations), but substituting separate variables for statist and liberal reforms in place of the single measure of economic reform employed in that 
study. All other variables are fixed at mean values.
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outcomes’ (Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 692). However, a 
meticulous comparison of protest coverage in the NYT and 
local media sources, though limited to just three Latin 
American countries in one year, found that ‘there are sig-
nificant country differences in the magnitude of the respec-
tive distortions’ in coverage even when a host of protest 
characteristics are taken into account (Herkenrath and 
Knoll, 2011: 164). These distortions in the Banks data, of 
course, make it more difficult to discern whatever effects 
liberalizing reforms may have on protest.
The issue of the relationship between liberalizing 
reforms and collective protest across Latin America’s 
democracies is crucially important. By bringing more and 
better quantitative data to the examination of the problem 
than previous work, Bellinger and Arce (2011) made impor-
tant contributions to the debate. As we have shown, how-
ever, the article’s results are far from conclusive. Whether 
markets are undermining or reinvigorating democracy in 
the region remains an open question.
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Notes
1. X in this equation refers to the matrix of included control vari-
ables, namely lagged GDP growth, lagged logged GDP per 
capita, lagged logged inflation, lagged imports plus exports 
as a percentage of GDP, lagged net inflows of foreign invest-
ment as a percentage of GDP, logged population, the level of 
economic liberalization, the regional mean of the dependent 
variable, and country dummies to capture fixed effects; the lag 
of the dependent variable was also included to control for any 
temporal dependence (Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 693–694).
2. The replication process was straightforward. Bellinger and 
Arce kindly and promptly supplied their data and command 
files at our request, and we were able to quickly and easily 
reproduce the results that they reported. This remains note-
worthy given the unfortunate difficulty that these tasks fre-
quently pose (see, e.g., Gelman, 2011; Janz, 2013).
3. By this classification, countries were considered democra-
cies if determined by Freedom House to be ‘free’ that is, they 
had an average score of 2.5 or lower on the seven-point indi-
ces of civil liberties and of political rights. Countries were 
considered semidemocracies if they had an average rating of 
3 to 5 and so were labeled as ‘partly free’. All others were 
classified as autocracies (Bellinger and Arce, 2011: 692).
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Appendix: All Re-analyses
Figure 6. Re-analyses of models included in ‘Table 1. Economic liberalization and protest using categorical measures of democracy’ 
(Bellinger and Arce 2011, 694).
Notes: The points indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and the whiskers trace 95% confidence intervals. Replicated 
results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 1, Model 2, Model 3, and Model 4. Model 4 uses a dichotomous measure of democracy and so no 
coefficient for semidemocracy is estimated. Coefficients for control variables are not depicted. All of the confidence intervals for semidemocracy 
and democracy (as indicated by the vertical whiskers) cross zero on the y-axis, indicating that the results are not statistically significant.
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Figure 7. Re-analyses of models included in ‘Table 3. Disaggregating democracy using Freedom House indices’ (Bellinger and Arce 
2011: 698). 
Notes: Solid lines indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and dotted lines trace the bounds of the 95% confidence inter-
vals. Replicated results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 5, Model 6, Model 7, and Model 8. Coefficients for control variables are not depicted. 
The lower bound of the 95% confidence interval never crosses zero on the y-axis of any of these graphs, indicating that the positive coefficients for 
economic liberalization estimated at higher, more democratic levels of these indices fail to reach statistical significance.
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Figure 8. Re-analyses of odels included in ‘Table 4a. Economic liberalization, democracy, and strikes’ (Bellinger and Arce 2011: 
699).
Notes: In the top row, the points indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and whiskers trace 95% confidence intervals. 
In the bottom panel, solid lines indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and dotted lines trace the bounds of the 95% 
confidence intervals. Replicated results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 9, Model 10, and Model 11. Model 10 uses a dichotomous measure of 
democracy and so no coefficient for semidemocracy is estimated. Coefficients for control variables are not depicted. In the top row, all of the 
confidence intervals for semidemocracy and democracy (as indicated by the vertical whiskers) cross zero on the y-axis, indicating that the results 
are not statistically significant. In the bottom panel, the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval never crosses zero on the y-axis, indicating that 
the positive coefficients for economic liberalization estimated at higher, more democratic levels of the FH Civil Liberties Index fail to reach statistical 
significance.
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Figure 9. Re-analyses of models included in ‘Table 4b. Economic liberalization, democracy, and riots’ (Bellinger and Arce 2011: 
700). 
Notes: In the top row, the points indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and whiskers trace 95% confidence intervals. In 
the bottom panel, solid lines indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and dotted lines trace the bounds of the 95% confi-
dence intervals. Replicated results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 12, Model 13, Model 14. Model 13 uses a dichotomous measure of democracy 
and so no coefficient for semidemocracy is estimated. Coefficients for control variables are not depicted. In the top row, all of the confidence inter-
vals for semidemocracy and democracy (as indicated by the vertical whiskers) cross zero on the y-axis, indicating that the results are not statistically 
significant. In the bottom panel, the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval never crosses zero on the y-axis, indicating that the positive coef-
ficients for economic liberalization estimated at higher, more democratic levels of the FH Civil Liberties Index fail to reach statistical significance.
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Figure 10. Re-analyses of models included in ‘Table 4c. Economic liberalization, democracy, and demonstrations’ (Bellinger and 
Arce 2011: 701). 
Notes: In the top row, the points indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and whiskers trace 95% confidence intervals. 
In the bottom panel, solid lines indicate coefficient estimates from negative binomial regressions, and dotted lines trace the bounds of the 95% 
confidence intervals. Replicated results of Bellinger and Arce (2011) Model 15, Model 16, and Model 17. Model 16 uses a dichotomous measure of 
democracy and so no coefficient for semidemocracy is estimated. 
Coefficients for control variables are not depicted. In the top row, all of the confidence intervals for semidemocracy and democracy (as indicated 
by the vertical whiskers) cross zero on the y-axis, indicating that the results are not statistically significant. In the bottom panel, the lower bound of 
the 95% confidence interval never crosses zero on the y-axis, indicating that the positive coefficients for economic liberalization estimated at higher, 
more democratic levels of the FH Civil Liberties Index fail to reach statistical significance.
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